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Abstract: This paper extends the now familiar Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) model of labor
market behavior to reconsider the controversial proposition that some forms of innovation
have persistent displacement e￿ects. In particular, it ￿nds that when distinctions between
random production failures and reduced e￿ort level are di￿cult to draw, the adoption
of new methods of production that compel more e￿ort, break down more often and/or
allow for closer supervision will sometimes induce technological joblessness. The possible
magnitude of such dislocation, its welfare e￿ects and the possibilities for intervention are
then discussed in detail.
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Tess :::started on her way up the dark and crooked
lane or street not made for hasty progress; a street
laid out before inches of land had value, and when
one-handed clocks su￿ciently subdivided the day.
Thomas Hardy, from Tess of the d’Urbervilles ,a s
quoted in Thompson (1967: 56)
1. Introduction
In a characteristic ￿ourish, the late historian E. P. Thompson (1967) used the
\street laid out ::: when one-handed clocks [su￿ced]" as a point of departure in
his landmark paper on the discipline of work and the measurement of time. The
introduction of reliable mechanical clocks into the ￿rst proto-factories, an \inno-
vation" that allowed those who supervised production to monitor better the e￿ort
of individual workers, altered forever the historical relationship between them, as
economic historians since Landes (1983) have underscored. The di￿usion of such
clocks constitutes an important, but often overlooked, form of technical change:
the rise in output per worker was not predicated on the acquisition of new tools or
di￿erent skills per se, but on \improvements" in the conditions of production.
Hounshell’s (1984) seminal work on the establishment of mass production meth-
ods in the United States provides another important example: the rapid spread of
* The earliest versions of this paper were written as part of dissertation research
(Matthews 1995) at Yale, and bene￿tted from conversations with Carolyn Craven,
John Geanakoplos, William Parker, Ben Polak and David Weiman. Since then, the
responses of other readers and seminar participants have done much to re￿ne the
exposition. The current revisions were completed as a visiting scholar at Yale and
UC San Diego, with generous leave support from Middlebury College. The usual
disclaimers hold.
1the \line" in manufacture was in some measure attributable to the attendant in-
crease in minimum e￿ort and/or the pace of production, as well as the enhanced
surveillance of workers. In illustrative terms, the \￿ve dollar workers" in Ford’s
automobile factories expended more of themselves, and found fewer opportunities
for \private behavior," than before.
Modern workers also confront innovation of this kind: whatever their other
bene￿ts, computers facilitate their closer supervision. In an argument that echoes
Marglin (1974) more than, for example, Landes (1986), Perelman (1998) concludes
that computerization has contributed less to social welfare than to the perfection
of \command and control structures" both in and out of the workplace. Given
the absence of well-de￿ned legal parameters (Anton and Ward 1998) on the surveil-
lance of workers in the United States, Greenlaw and Prudeanu (1997) conclude that
little but the potential adverse consequences of \demoralization" preclude routine
monitoring of computer use, including, of course, electronic mail. 1
A formal characterization of this phenomenon requires a model in which work-
ers exert some control over e￿ort - the question of supervision does not otherwise
arise - and capitalists are able to choose between \techniques" that di￿er both in
terms of required e￿ort and the measurement of performance. The \e￿ort extraction
literature" - a literature that includes, but is much broader than, the Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) variant of the e￿ciency wage hypothesis 2 or EWH - therefore pro-
1 For example, it has been possible for some time to count keystrokes, watch
operators’ screens, monitor phone use and even location, et cetera. In response,
Congress considered considered, but did not pass, the Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act (PCWA) in 1997.
2 Bowles (1986), for example, contrasts the \neo-Hobbesian" treatment of the
problem in mainstream models with his own, which is rooted in Marx (1867). Reb-
itzer (1993) reviews the contributions of radical political economists to this literature
in more detail.
2vides a natural framework for analysis. Several contributions to this literature merit
particular attention in this context. In their empirical work, for example, Bowles,
Gordon and Weisskopf (1984, 1989) have underscored the connection between the
\social structure(s) of accumulation" and the extraction of labor, and argue that
the ascendance of conservative economics in the 1980s produced an increase in the
share of pro￿ts in national income, but not (until the mid-1990s, perhaps) in the
adjusted rate of pro￿t. This suggests that capitalists found, and perhaps still ￿nd,
themselves under pressure to \discover" methods of production that undercut the
representative worker’s bargaining position. It then seems reasonable to suppose
that innovations which increase the pace of production and/or the likeihood that
\non-performance" is detected will become more attractive than is otherwise desir-
able.
It also seems plausible that such methods will \fail" or break down more of-
ten, and Levine (1989) considers the implications for the Shapiro-Stiglitz model if
capitalists who observe low e￿ort levels cannot be sure whether the cause is in fact
\shirking" 3 or measurement error. A similar problem exists when capitalists pos-
sess reliable measures of aggregate e￿ort/output, but are uncertain when the value
of this measure falls which workers are \responsible." In either case, both shirkers
and non-shirkers are sometimes dismissed in the resulting equilibrium, a violation of
the \just cause principle." In this context, the enforcement of just cause legislation,
often advocated on the grounds of fairness, can become Pareto e￿cient.
In the model articulated here, capitalists are able to increase both the minimum
e￿ort level and the likelihood of detection with the introduction of new, perhaps
3 Most radical and some mainstream (Bulow and Summers 1986, for example)
economists are uncomfortable with this characterization of the \contested exchange"
(Bowles and Gintis 1993) between capitalist/￿rm and worker, but the term has
proven a durable one, and is adopted here.
3capital intensive, methods of production. To extend Adam Smith’s (1776) famous
example, the increase in the number of pins each worker produces following the
division of labor is in some measure attributable to the strict discipline, increased
e￿ort and closer supervision that such specialization induces. With this increase in
e￿ort, however, comes an increase in the likelihood of failure: as individual workers
are pushed toward their respective limits, breakdowns become more frequent. The
worker who \points" drawn wire - one of eighteen (!) distinct operations that Smith
(1776: 5) enumerated - will fall short of her target more often than her predecessors,
who oversaw the production of pins from start to ￿nish. Furthermore, supervisors
will no doubt ￿nd it more di￿cult to distinguish this sort of non-performance from
the more deliberate withdrawal of e￿ort, a variant of Levine’s (1989) model. This
information problem has important social and economic consequences: an otherwise
productive worker whose \failure" is a random event di￿ers in most relevant senses
from one who is unproductive because she contests the terms of her wage bargain.
In another contribution to the literature, Ag￿enor and Aizenman (1997) invoke
the EWH to characterize both the labor market displacement and segmentation
e￿ects of skill-biased technical change in a two sector model of the sort described in
Bulow and Summers (1986). Their results lead to one of the most important, and
controversial, issues considered here: to the extent that the use of computers and
other innovations have increased the pace of production and/or enhanced capitalists’
surveillance powers, is permanent \technological unemployment" a possible result?
After the optimization problems of workers and capitalists have been characterized
in some detail, the fourth and ￿fth sections of this paper consider the model’s
possible equilibria, and evaluate these on the basis of reasonable parameter values.
It is concluded that technological displacement is sometimes possible, even probable,
a result that in turn calls for some discussion of the model’s welfare implications
and the possibilities for intervention.
In this context, the paper should also be understood as a contribution to the
debate that Ricardo (1817: 388) ignited almost two centuries ago, when he reversed
4himself on the so-called \machinery question" :
These were my opinions, and they continue unaltered, as far as
regards the landlord and the capitalist; but I am [now] convinced,
that the substitution of machinery for human labor, is often very
injurious to the interests of the class of laborers.
This said, the rationale for the displacement e￿ect described below is di￿erent,
in both form and spirit, from either Ricardo’s or those of his intellectual heirs
(Duchin and Leontief 1986, for example). It also di￿ers from less common Keynesian
treatments (Asimakopulos 1988, for example) of the phenomenon.
2. Workers
Following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the existence of H identical and in￿nite-lived
workers is supposed, each of whom cares about real wages and the pace of work in
each (discrete) period. If the representative worker is further assumed to be risk
neutral, her within period vNM function will have the form:
vi(!i;e i)=!i ￿ ei (2:1)
after normalization, where !i is the real wage and ei is some measure of e￿ort. The
substitution of real labor income for consumption in (2.1) can be rationalized on the
grounds that workers do not, or perhaps cannot, save between periods, but this is
not essential: as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) observe, the same speci￿cation obtains
if capital markets are assumed to be perfect. 4 The observation that capital markets
are not (in this sense) perfect, however, and that workers sometimes ￿nd it di￿cult
to borrow at competitive rates of interest (Ausubel 1991), implies that (1 + i)￿1 is
4 This second interepretation invites debate, however. Critics of the EWH have
sometimes claimed that if capital markets were indeed perfect, the introduction
of performance bonds would eliminate the incentive to shirk (Carmichael, 1990).
There is little evidence, however, that the markets for such bonds function well, if
at all.
5not the relevant discount rate, so the simple rate of time preference ￿ is used here
instead.
If attention is restricted to long run (steady state) equilibria, the notion of a
\job o￿er" is not di￿cult to formalize. The jth capitalist, j =1 ;:::;M, M< <H ,
who chooses the kth method of production o￿ers her workers !
j
k each period until the
latter are either \separated" or dismissed for non-performance. It is further assumed
that capitalists must choose between two methods of production - a mixture is
excluded - and that this choice determines the minimum required e￿ort level e
j
k
where e2 >e 1. Workers must in turn decide whether to expend this amount of
e￿ort or none at all - it is impossible, in other words, to \shirk a little bit." The
choice of technique also determines the conditional probabilities f
j
k that a worker
\fails" in a particular period despite the expenditure of e￿ort, and d
j
k that non-
performance, the result of either no e￿ort or a breakdown in production, is detected
ex post, where, in the spirit of the previous discussion, d2 >d 1 but f2 >f 1.I ti s
also assumed that capitalists cannot distinguish between the two sources of non-
performance, but similar results would obtain if the power to do so were imperfect.
What matters, in other words, is that non-performance is a mixed signal, which
forces each capitalist to decide what percentage s
j
k of detected workers should be
dismissed.
The observation that workers will sometimes fail and that capitalists cannot tell
the di￿erence between such failure and \non-cooperative behavior" has important
social and economic consequences, not least of which are its e￿ects on the com-
position of the jobless pool. The standard Shapiro-Stiglitz model predicts that all
equilibrium worker-capitalist separations will be the result of quits or involuntary
separations, since there is no incentive to withhold e￿ort if the \no shirking condi-
tion" (NSC) is satis￿ed. It is a weakness of this model, therefore, that the observed
behavior of labor markets suggests otherwise: as Okun (1981) and others have
reminded economists interested in labor market microfoundations, a sizeable pro-
portion of separations are not worker-initiated. Within the framework of the model
6described here, some workers will quit and others will be dismissed, but those ￿red
for non-performance will not be shirkers: because the incentive condition is met
in equilibrium, all capitalist-initiated job loss will be the result of random failure.
Whether or not this enhances the realism of the model is unclear: the capitalist
or ￿rm now assumes a more active role, but the implication that all dismissals are
without cause is no less problematic.
It is further supposed that individual capitalists must precommit to a particular
method of production at the start of each period, and that this choice is observable,







k is credible. The same cannot be assumed about dismissal policies,
however. If the search for replacement workers were costly, the choice of an optimal
dismissal rate would be a complicated one. On the one hand, each capitalist would
have some incentive to announce that dismissal rates are high because such behavior
would, if believed, reduce the real wage required to induce e￿ort. On the other hand,
if workers do not then shirk, capitalists should be reluctant to dismiss for non-
performance because those who are dismissed will be otherwise productive workers
whose failure was a random event, in which case a smaller dismissal rate would
reduce search costs. To underscore the basic themes of this paper, however, it will
be assumed that search costs are zero, that capitalists’ previous behaviors are well
known, and that the parameters of their pro￿t-maximization problem, including
the exogenous likelihood q that a worker who neither shirks nor fails will quit her
position at the end of a particular period, are common knowledge.
If the M capitalists are identical and each sets the same terms in equilib-
rium, the derivation of the incentive conditions is involved, but not di￿cult. Let
(!1;e 1;f 1;d1;s 1) and (!2;e 2;f 2;d2;s 2) denote the \contracts" for ￿rst and second
method workers, and de￿ne V1;k, V2;k and V3 to be (resp.) the lifetime utilities of
non-shirkers hired to work with the kth method, shirkers hired to work with the
kth method, and jobless workers. 5 The precise form of the NSCs follows from two
5 This assumes that the contracts are unique, an assumption that is sensible for
7initial observations:
Proposition 1. The lifetime utilities of the non-shirkers under contract are:
V1;k =
!k ￿ ek + ￿(fkdksk + q(1 ￿ fkdksk))V3
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ fkdksk)
k =1 ;2( 2 :2)
and
Proposition 2. The lifetime utilities of the shirkers under contract are:
V2;k =
!k + ￿(dksk + q(1 ￿ dksk))V3
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ dksk)
k =1 ;2( 2 :3)
Proof(s): The proofs for these and most of the propositions that follow are collected
in an appendix.
A worker hired to use method k will expend the required e￿ort ek if, and only if,
the reward for such \co-operation" is at least as large as that for non-cooperation
or, in other words, V1;k ￿ V2;k. It follows from (2.2) and (2.3) that this condition
can be expressed as:
!k ￿ ek + ￿(fkdksk + q(1 ￿ fkdksk))V3
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ fkdksk)
￿
!k + ￿(dksk + q(1 ￿ dksk))V3
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ dksk)
(2:4)
which, after simpli￿cation and elimination of the \ >" , can be expressed as:
Proposition 3. The incentive conditions (NSCs) are:
!k =
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ dksk)
￿(1 ￿ q)dksk(1 ￿ fk)
￿
ek +( 1￿ ￿)V3 k =1 ;2( 2 :5)
Most of the properties of (2.5) are simple extensions of standard results: the real
wage rates !1 and !2 needed to induce e￿ort levels e1 and e2 are each decreasing
functions of the rate of time preference ￿ and the (respective) probabilities of de-
tection d1 and d2, and increasing functions of the separation rate q, the e￿ort e￿ort
the techniques considered below.
8levels, and the welfare of jobless workers V3. In addition, however, !k is also a
decreasing function of the failure rates fk and the \dismissal policies" sk. Neither
of these properties comes as a surprise: as the likelihood that method k workers
fail rises, for example, the likelihood that non-shirkers will lose their jobs at the
end of each period also rises, which reduces the \punishment value" of dismissal,
and forces capitalists to increase !k. Likewise, as the dismissal rate sk increases,
the likelihood that non-performance, if detected, is punished, and this reduces the
value of the incentives capitalists must provide.
The conditions (2.5) are not reduced forms, of course. The welfare of jobless
workers V3 cannot be one of the model’s primitives - in this one sector model, it is a
function of the exogenous value of jobless bene￿ts ￿! and the probabilities of rehire,
denoted a1 and a2. (The model does admit a two sector interpretation, however,
one that should be recalled in the calibration exercises that follow: if it is assumed
that all the workers not hired to use one of the two methods are then \absorbed"
into a \dual" sector without the same information/control problems, the value of
￿ ! can be understood as a constant second sector wage, a variant of the Bulow and
Summers (1986) model. Viewed from this perspective, the existence of a constant,
or even falling, jobless rate is not inconsistent with technological displacement, an
important feature of this model in the current macroeconomic climate.) Inasmuch
as the comparative statics of variations in jobless bene￿ts/dual sector wages are
well known, the value of ￿ ! is set equal to zero here. 6 Some additional assumptions
6 The premise needs some quali￿cation. Until Albrecht and Vroman’s (1999)
recent contribution, attention was limited to the Shapiro-Stiglitz model in which
each capitalist compensated the workers she dismissed at some predetermined rate.
It would be more realistic to suppose, however, that the state both determines and
distributes such bene￿ts, with some reliance on dedicated tax revenues. On the basis
of their more elaborate model, Albrecht and Vroman (1999) compare the properties
of a proportional payroll tax and one that re￿ects ￿rms’ \experience ratings," and
￿nd that the latter is associated with more jobs, less shirking and more output.
9on the \matching mechanism" are needed, and it is supposed that each job seeker
receives at most one o￿er at the start of each period. The probabilities ak that a
particular worker receives an o￿er from a method k capitalist are exogenous from
the perspectives of each worker and capitalist but not, of course, in the aggregate,
where a1 and a2 move to equilibrate the markets for labor power in the long run. 7
With this in mind, their in￿uence on the welfare of job seekers V3 is not di￿cult to
formalize:
Proposition 4. If the incentive conditions (2.5) are satis￿ed, then:
V3 =
a1V1;1 + a2V1;2
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a1 ￿ a2)
(2:6)
This result has the simple, but important, implication that lim a1+a2!1 V3 = a1V1;1+
a2V1;2, which con￿rms the critical intuition behind all such models: as labor mar-
kets become less slack, and the combined likelihood of rehire approaches one, the
expected punishment value of dismissal, the di￿erence between a1V1;1 + a2V1;2 and
V3, approaches zero.
Combined, the ￿rst and fourth propositions constitute three conditions in three
(V1;1, V1;2 and V3) unknowns, which allows the reduced forms for each to be calcu-
lated, and for the NSCs to be written in terms of the model’s primitives:






1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a1)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1)
+
7 The reference to the \long run" - the term \potential" would be preferable,
perhaps - is in deference to those who argue, with cause, that there is no room for
e￿ective demand, and therefore traditional macroeconomic policies, in such models.
Equilibrium in an e￿ort elicitation model is perhaps best understood in terms of the
maximum, rather than the actual, number of workers under contract each period,
notwithstanding the recent work of Kimball (1994) and others on the disequilibrium
properties of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model.
10a2(!2 ￿ e2)
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a2)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2)
(2:7)
Proposition 6. The reduced form incentive conditions (NSCs) are:
!k =
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ dksk)








1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a1)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1)
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1)








1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a2)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2)
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2)
￿(1 ￿ q)d2s2(1 ￿ f2)
￿
a2e2 (2:8)
for k =1 ;2, where
￿=
(1 ￿ a1)(1 ￿ a2)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1))(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2)) ￿ a1a2
(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a1)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1))(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a2)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2))
(2:9)
It is an important, and perhaps surprising, feature of (2.8) that the di￿erence be-
tween ￿rst and second method wages !1 ￿ !2 is a function of the institutional
parameters ￿ and q and the conditions of production ek, fk and dk, but not the
probabilities of rehire ak or the jobless rate, which means that the technical condi-
tions of production do not exert an in￿uence on either. Furthermore, this premium
is reminiscent of Adam Smith’s (1776) modern treatment of the compensating dif-
ferential.
113. Capitalists
The representative capitalist’s choice of dismissal rates can be inferred before the
pro￿t maximization problem is described in detail. Observe ￿rst that given the all
other capitalists’ demands for ￿rst and second method workers and therefore the
levels of compensation !1 and !2, as well as the value of their \fallback position"
V3, it is not di￿cult to show, using an argument similar to that in the proof of the












ek +( 1￿ ￿)V3 k =1 ;2( 3 :1)
With V3 ￿xed from the perspective of the individual capitalist, it becomes clear
that the right hand side of (3.1) is decreasing in s
j
k, and that each capitalist will




2 = 1, a decision that creates (negative,
of course) externalities for her rivals. That is,
Proposition 7. All capitalists will choose the \harshest" possible dismissal poli-
cies: s
j
k =1for all j and k.
Within this framework, then, competition for labor power maximizes the number of
unjust dismissals: because the NSCs are satis￿ed in equilibrium, the enforcement of
harsh dismissal policies means that all random failure results in job loss, and that
absent the exogenous quit/separation rate, all job loss is the consequence of such
failure. Whatever the robustness of this feature, it is, to repeat an earlier claim,
at least consistent with the observation that dismissal for non-performance is an
important source of additions to the jobless pool in the \real world."
Given the choice of dismissal policies, the expressions for !
j




k = !k =  kek +( 1￿ ￿)V3 k =1 ;2( 3 :2)
where:
 k =
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ dk)
￿(1 ￿ q)dk(1 ￿ fk)






2 = !1 ￿ !2 =  1e1 ￿  2e2 (3:4)
where V3 is understood to be exogenous with respect to !
j
k but not !k. As alluded
to in the previous section, (3.4) implies that the method-based wage di￿erential is
not a function of the likelihoods of rehire a1 and a2 or therefore the \thickness" of
labor markets.
The di￿erences in the conditions of production - e￿ort levels, detection rates
and failure rates - complicate the characterization of capitalist behavior; for pur-
poses of exposition, a streamlined, but suggestive, version of the pro￿t maximization
problem is considered here. Suppose ￿rst that while capitalists must precommit to
one of the two methods at the beginning of each period, the capital or ￿xed costs of
each are, for the moment, equal. It is further assumed that the two methods exhibit
constant returns to e￿ective labor below some predetermined limit 8 and that this
return is constant across methods , a restriction that limits attention to di￿erences







k if 0 ￿ N
j
k ￿ ￿ N
￿￿ Lk if N
j




k is the number of units of e￿ective labor hired and N
j
k is the number
of non-shirkers under contract, and where M ￿ N>H . It follows that within this
8 This is a restriction with some basis in the empirical literature. Even Bils
(1987), who ￿nds that the short run marginal costs of production are procyclical,
attributes this to the use of more expensive overtime labor, not the existence of
diminishing returns per se. Furthermore, he also ￿nds that this behavior is not
mirrored in prices, in which case reliance on a ￿xed mark-up over constant average
variable costs is not unreasonable. See also Blinder et al (1998). Inasmuch as
macroeconomic considerations have in￿uenced the speci￿cation of ￿rm behavior,
and not vice versa, this is perhaps an example of the \macrofoundations of micro"
(Colander 1993).
13context, the existence of an equilibrium in which all (or some) capitalists choose the
second method will be the result of increased e￿ort levels and/or detection rates,
and nothing else. 9
The need to choose between otherwise similar methods of production is a con-
sequence of the fact that it is labor power, not e￿ective labor, that is exchanged
in the market. The capitalist who hires N
j
k non-shirkers commands ek(1 ￿ fk)N
j
k
units of e￿ective labor - each of the (1 ￿ fk)N
j
k workers who does not fail exerts







k if 0 ￿ N
j
k ￿ ￿ N
￿ek(1 ￿ fk) ￿ N if N
j
k ￿ ￿ N
(3:6)
Since there is no reason to suppose that e1(1￿f1) is equal to e2(1￿f2), the marginal
product of labor power, as opposed to e￿ective labor, is not uniform. From another
perspective, given the behavior of her rivals, the jth capitalist will have real annual
per unit labor costs of !
j
k=￿ek(1 ￿ fk) when she chooses method k.
Last, it will be assumed that competition in product markets is imperfect, and
that each capitalist exerts some power over prices. 10 In particular, suppose that
no matter what the mixture of ￿rst and second method capitalists, their combined
sales revenues will be a proportion (1 + ￿) of total labor costs, where ￿, a mark-up
of sorts, is su￿cient to more than cover ￿xed/capital costs. Thus, if all capitalists
choose the ￿rst method, for example, the aggregate demand for labor power schedule
will be horizontal (until M ￿ N, of course, at which point it is vertical) with !1 =
￿e1(1 ￿ f1)=(1 + ￿). Since the pro￿ts of no single capitalists are large enough to
9 Other things being equal, the assumed di￿erence in failure rates reduces the
attractiveness of the second method.
10 There is no need to commit to one \imperfection" over another in this context.
The model is more or less consistent with several of those outlined in, for example,
Startz (1989) or Silvestre (1992).
14in￿uence ￿, a ￿rst method capitalist would therefore have an incentive to switch to
the second if her new per unit labor costs ^!
j
2=￿e2(1￿f2), where ^ !
j
2 is understood to
be the wage she must o￿er second method workers when all other capitalists have
committed to the ￿rst method, are less than !1=￿e1(1￿f1) or, substituting for !1,
if ^ !
j
2=￿e2(1 ￿ f2) < 1+￿.
A ￿nal technical restriction is then needed to ensure that both methods are
feasible. For reasons that will become clear in the next section, it will be su￿cient to
suppose that ￿(1￿q)[dk(1￿fk)2￿￿+(1￿d2)] > 1 for both k, where ￿￿ = ￿=(1+￿)
is a scaled value of output per unit of e￿ective labor. This serves, in e￿ect, as an
intuitive lower bound on ￿.
154. Equilibrium
4.1 The General Approach
The conditions under which labor markets clear are not di￿cult to state in abstract
terms. Suppose that M1 and M2 = M ￿ M1 capitalists choose the ￿rst and second
methods and that their combined demands for ￿rst and second method workers are
N1(!1;! 2) and N2(!1;! 2). For each pair (!1;! 2), these determine the likelihoods
of rehire a1 and a2 and, on the basis of the Implicit Function Theorem, the in-
verse demand functions !1 = !1(a1;a 2) and !2 = !2(a1;a 2). Combined with the
NSCs (2.8), a second pair of expressions for !1 and !2 that depend on a1 and a2,
there are four independent relations in four unknowns, solutions of which constitute
clearance of the labor market(s). An equilibrium is then de￿ned to be a quadruple
(!1;! 2;a 1;a 2) such that labor markets clear and no capitalist regrets her choice of
technique.
The second step in this construction, the connection between the numbers of
￿rst and second method workers N1 and N2 and the probabilities of rehire a1 and
a2, remains to be elaborated, however. The equalization of ￿ows into and out of
various \states" in the labor market requires that:
Proposition 8. In equilibrium, the probabilities of rehire a1 and a2 are:
ak =
(fkdk + q(1 ￿ fkdk))Nk
H ￿ (1 ￿ q)((1 ￿ f1d1)N1 +( 1￿ f2d2)N2)
k =1 ;2( 4 :1)
As one would expect, there is a positive relationship between ak and Nk: the greater
the number of workers hired to use method k, the greater the likelihood of rehire
ak.
The conditions under which a second method equilibrium exists, and the labor
market consequences of the establishment of such an equilibrium, are the principal
concern here, however, and the previous restrictions on production and price for-
mation facilitate the characterization of these. In particular, absent a measure zero
coincidence, \mixed equilibria" in which both methods are used are impossible, in
16which case attention can be turned to a simple(r) question: If all capitalists have
committed to one method or the other, will one or more have an incentive to deviate
from this outcome?
4.2 Existence of a (Unique) Second Method Equilibrium
Consider the market for second method workers when all capitalists use this method,
as pictured in Figure 1. The intersection E0 of the demand for labor power and
the incentive condition or NSC (2.8), plotted here as a function of N2 rather than
a2, determines the values of !￿
2 and N￿
2. As the diagram suggests, workers under
contract will receive ￿e2(1￿f2)=(1+￿) each period, and each capitalist will receive
a share 1=M of total pro￿ts, equal to ( ￿=1+￿)￿e2(1 ￿ f2)N￿
2. The jth capitalist
will have no incentive to switch if per unit labor costs after doing so, ^!
j
1=￿e1(1 ￿
f1), where ^ !
j
1 is the compensation she must o￿er her new ￿rst method workers,
conditional on other capitalists’ commitment to the second method, exceed current
per unit labor costs, equal to 1 =(1 + ￿).
How does the jth capitalist know what wage ^ !
j
1 she must o￿er if no ￿rst method
contracts exist? The answer is contained in the constant di￿erential (3.4): in terms
of the current notation, !￿
2 ￿ ^ !
j
1 is equal to  1e1 ￿  2e2, where  1 and  2 are as
de￿ned in (3.3). Given the initial value of !￿
2, it follows that per unit costs with
















+  2e2 ￿  1e1
￿
(4:2)
No capitalist will switch from the candidate second method equilibrium 11 if this
value is more that (1 + ￿) or, after some simpli￿cation, if:
￿￿(e2(1 ￿ f2) ￿ e1(1 ￿ f1)) > ( 2e2 ￿  1e1)( 4 :3)
11 It is assumed here that if per unit labor costs are equal, capitalists will use the
\older" method.
17Figure 1. The Labor Market When All Capitalists Choose the Second Method
18where, once more, ￿￿ =( 1+￿)￿1￿ is an adjusted or\marked down" output per
worker. The intuition for (4.3) is straightforward: the left hand side is the scaled
di￿erence, positive or negative, in the marginal products of labor power for the two
methods, and the right hand side is the di￿erence in the wages needed to secure
workers’ co-operation with each.
Because the second method is assumed to increase both e￿ort levels and failure
rates, the sign of e2(1￿f2)￿e1(1￿f1) is uncertain. If the more \modern" method
features a higher marginal product of labor power - that is, if e2(1￿f2) >e 1(1￿f1)
- the \no switch condition" (4.3) can be written:
￿￿ >
 2e2 ￿  1e1
e2(1 ￿ f2) ￿ e1(1 ￿ f1)
(4:4)
Two sub-cases can then be distinguished: (a) if  1e1 ￿  2e2 - that is, the numerator
in (4.4) is less than or equal to zero - then no capitalist will switch to the ￿rst
method, no matter what the value of ￿￿, since the second method is more productive
and workers hired to use it are \cheaper," but (b) if  1e1 <  2e2, the value of ￿￿
must exceed a critical bound ￿ ￿ for defection to be unpro￿table. The lower bound is
needed in this case because the switch to the ￿rst method reduces the value of the
incentive the capitalist must provide - that is, the di￿erence  2e2 ￿ 1e1 is negative
- which means that the assumed di￿erence in output per unit of e￿ective labor, an
increasing function of ￿￿, must more than o￿set this.
If, on the other hand, e2(1 ￿ f2) is less than (or equal to) e1(1 ￿ f1) - in other
words, if the marginal product of labor power with the \older," more \primitive,"
method is at least as high - the condition under which no capitalist will switch from
the second method becomes:
￿￿ <
 1e1 ￿  2e2
e1(1 ￿ f1) ￿ e2(1 ￿ f2)
(4:5)
if e1(1 ￿ f1) 6= e2(1 ￿ f2), and  1e1 >  2e2 otherwise. Once more, there are two
sub-cases to consider: (a) if  1e1 >  2e2, (4.5) establishes ￿ ￿ as an upper bound on
￿￿, but (b) if  1e1 ￿  2e2, capitalists will switch en masse to the ￿rst method, no
19matter what the value of ￿￿. In the ￿rst sub-case (a), an upper bound is needed
because under the relevant conditions, the second method is less productive but also
less expensive than the ￿rst, and if the di￿erence in productivities, which increases
in ￿￿, is not too large, capitalists will still not have an incentive to switch to the ￿rst
method. In the second, no second method equilibrium exists because it is both less
productive and more expensive. The inference that neither sub-case is plausible
from an historical standpoint - it seems reasonable to suppose that for each of
the innovations described earlier, the e￿ort e￿ect was dominant - is tempting, but
premature: there are no doubt hundreds, even thousands, of smaller innovations for
which this is not the case.
There is another, perhaps more intuitive, interpretation of these conditions,








d2(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d1))
d1(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d2))
each of which ranges from 1 to 1.12 The ￿rst of these, ￿e, the ratio of the second
to ￿rst method e￿ort levels, is a natural measure of the size of the e￿ort e￿ect
associated with the former, while the second, ￿f, the ratio of ￿rst to second method
success rates, can be considered an index of the failure e￿ect. The third ratio, ￿d,
is a measure of the detection e￿ect associated with the second method: given the
rate of time preference ￿ and separation rate q, it rises with d2 and falls with d1.
Recognizing that  1= 2 = ￿d=￿f, the preceding discussion can then be summarized
as:
Proposition 9. A second method equilibrium will exist if:
￿e > (=)￿f and ￿f￿e ￿ (<)￿d (4:6)
or
￿e >￿ f and ￿f￿e >￿ d and ￿￿ > ￿ ￿ (4:7)
12 Given the restrictions on e and f, this is trivial to show for ￿e and ￿f.I t i s
not di￿cult, but tedious, to show this for ￿d.
20or
￿e <￿ f and ￿f￿e <￿ d and ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ (4:8)
where ￿e, ￿d and ￿f are the e￿ort, detection and failure e￿ects associated with that
method.
The ￿rst pair of inequalities (4.6) claims, in other words, that a second method
equilibrium exists if both the e￿ort and detection e￿ects are, in a precise sense,
\large enough." This should come as no surprise, of course: because the two meth-
ods of production are otherwise identical, capitalists will ￿nd the second method
attractive for two reasons - more e￿ort and closer supervision - and unattractive for
one - more frequent breakdowns - and if the e￿ort and detection e￿ects are both
substantial, there will be no reason to switch to the ￿rst. The second set of inequal-
ities (4.7) asserts, on the other hand, that if the detection e￿ect is not substantial,
a second method equilibrium will still exist if the e￿ort e￿ect dominates the failure
e￿ect and the marginal product of labor power, and therefore the di￿erence in the
marginal products of e￿ective labor, is also, in the sense described above, substan-
tial. The third and ￿nal set (4.8) implies that a second method equilibrium will
sometimes exist even if the e￿ort e￿ect is smaller than the failure e￿ect, provided
the detection e￿ect is substantial and the marginal product of labor power is not.
Combined, (4.7) and (4.8) suggest that either the e￿ort or detection e￿ect must be
dominant for a second method equilibrium to exist.
Last, it is not di￿cult to show that under the restrictions imposed here, the
conditions under which a second method equilibrium exists are also those under
which individual capitalists have an incentive to deviate when all choose the ￿rst
method. That is, if one of these conditions are satis￿ed, the second method equilib-
rium is unique, but if none are, there will exist a unique ￿rst method equilibrium.
214.3 Technological Unemployment
Suppose that a unique second method equilibrium exists. Will it exhibit techno-
logical unemployment in the precise sense that N￿
2 is smaller than N￿
1, the num-
ber of workers hired when capitalists must choose the ￿rst method? (I have also
used \structural displacement" to describe this phenomenon, but this comes with
a caveat: because the e￿ects are permanent, not persistent, this is not the medium
term disequilibrium phenomenon most macroeconomists have in mind when such
terms are used.) The answer is no, not under all conditions: the power to extract
more e￿ort from each non-shirking worker does not always mean that fewer workers
are hired. The surprise, perhaps, is that within this framework, the displacement
of workers does not turn on di￿erences in e￿ort levels, but rather on the di￿erences
in detection and failure rates.
To see this, note ￿rst that when all capitalists have chosen the second method,
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 6 = ￿(1 ￿q)(d2(1 ￿f2)2￿￿ +(1￿d2))￿1 and  8 = f2d2 +q(1 ￿f2d2)( 4 :13)
and the jobless rate u￿
2 =1￿(N￿
2=H) in a second method equilibrium will therefore
be  8=( 6 +  8).
Even in this streamlined model, the solution for u￿
2 is perhaps \messier" than
one would like, but its properties are consistent with intuition. An increase in the
value of ￿￿, for example, the result of either a broad increase in output per unit
of labor power ￿ or a decrease in capitalists’ mark-up ￿, causes the value of  6
to rise and the jobless rate u￿
2 to fall. In graphical terms, the demand for labor
power schedule shifts upward against a ￿xed NSC curve, so that more workers are
hired, and each is paid more. An increase in the value of ￿, on the other hand, is
also associated with an increase in  6 and thus a decrease in u￿
2, but for di￿erent
reasons: because workers care more about future income, the NSC curve shifts
downward - that is, the wage required to induce e￿ort falls for each N2 - while
the demand schedule is una￿ected, in which case more workers will be hired at a
constant real wage. For similar reasons, a decrease in the separation/quit rate will
also be associated with reduced joblessness.
The comparative statics of variations in d2 and f2 are more complicated, of
course, but di￿erentiation of u￿
2 with respect to the failure rate, for example, con-
￿rms that an increase in f2 is associated with a rise in joblessness: the demand
for labor power schedule shifts downward because the representative non-shirker is
now less productive, while the incentive condition or NSC shifts upward, because
the likelihood of dismissal without just cause has risen, both of which tend to drive
the number of hires and the wage rate downward. In a similar vein, di￿erentia-
tion of (4.13) with respect to d2 demonstrates that better supervision is associated
23with increased joblessness, too: output per unit of e￿ective, non-shirking, labor is
unchanged, but the wage required to induce e￿ort e2 rises.
The same expression (4.13) also rationalizes the observation that the displace-
ment question does not involve the comparison of e￿ort levels, a much less intuitive
result: neither  6 nor  8 are functions of e2, so neither is u￿
2. As a matter of arith-
metic, the e￿ort variable e2 is \lost" because both sides of (4.9) are proportional
to it. The left hand side is proportional to e2 because the supposition that the
marginal product of labor power is constant implies that !￿
2 = ￿￿e2(1 ￿ f2), while
the right hand side exhibits this feature because v(￿;￿) is linear - that is, workers
are assumed to be risk neutral. If either of these is not the case - if, for example,
workers are instead assumed to be risk averse (see Chatterji and Sparks’ 1991 e￿ort
elicitation model, for example) - then N￿
2 will depend on e2, as well as f2 and d2.
From a graphical standpoint, the structure of the model ensures that if the pace of
production rises, both the NSC and the demand for labor power schedules will shift
upward the same amount, measured from N￿
2.
For identical reasons, the number of workers N￿
1 under contract and the asso-
ciated jobless rate u￿










 5 +  7
(4:14)
where, of course:
 5 = ￿(1￿q)(d1(1￿f1)2￿￿+(1￿d1))￿1 and  7 = f1d1+q(1￿f1d1)( 4 :15)
It follows, therefore, that when a second method equilibrium exists, it will involve
technological unemployment if:
 8
 6 +  8
>
 7








The two sides of (4.16) di￿er with respect f and d alone and, on the basis of the
previous comparative statics exercises, the sign of the \displacement e￿ect" is am-
biguous: the more substantial the detection e￿ect, the greater the di￿erence between
24the right and left hand sides of (4.16), but the more substantial the failure e￿ect,
the smaller this di￿erence becomes. Furthermore, it is not di￿cult to show that for
admissable, if not reasonable, parameter values, the latter sometimes dominates,
in which case the number of workers under contract will rise in a second method
equilibrium.
The comparison of !￿
1 and !￿
2 is much simpler. Since workers receive !￿
1 =
￿￿e1(1 ￿ f1) if all capitalists commit to the ￿rst method, it follows that !￿
2 will be
more or less than !￿
1 as e2(1 ￿ f2) is more or less than e1(1 ￿ f1) or, in terms of
the e￿ects identi￿ed earlier, as the e￿ort e￿ect ￿e is more or less than the failure
e￿ect ￿f. If the previous conjecture that ￿e will in practice exceed ￿f is correct,
it follows that fewer workers are hired in second method equilibria but those under
contract are paid more, in which case there is a trade-o￿ to be considered.
5. Numbers and Policies
5.1 Model Realism
If the pursuit and eventual introduction of technologies that increase e￿ort lev-
els, failure rates and the extent of supervision are in fact an important historical
phenomenon, the existence of a second method equilibria should be more than \pos-
sible." It is important, then, that the results of the previous section be re-evaluated
on the basis of reasonable parameter values. The approach adopted here will be to
choose values for both the common and ￿rst method parameters, and then calcu-
late the size of the e￿ort e￿ect, and its labor market consequences, associated with
second method equilibria for various combinations of f2 and d2. Given the results
in Summers and Poterba (1986) or Kletzer (1998), for example, a combined separa-
tion/quit rate of ￿fteen percent per annum ( q =0 :15) is a sensible, if conservative,
￿rst choice. The representative worker’s rate of time preference ￿ will be set equal to
0.95, a value that corresponds, in the case where workers are able to borrow against
future income, to a real interest rate of ￿ve percent per annum. On the other hand,
there is little aggregate data on rates of industrial breakdown, and even less on the
25\all or nothing" sort of failure assumed here: to err on the side of caution, f1 will be
set equal to 0.10. In the context of Gordon’s (1990) work on the ratio of managers
and supervisors to production workers, it will also be assumed that the conditional
likelihood of detection with even the ￿rst method is substantial: d1 =0 :5013
The normalization of the representative worker’s vNM function and the inde-
pendence of the jobless rate u and the e￿ort level e then force the values of ￿￿ and
e1. Under the single sector interpretation of the model , for example, the choice
￿￿ = 15, which implies that u￿
1 =0 :0428 or 4.28 percent when all capitalists select
the ￿rst method, is consistent with recent US experience. Given this value of ￿￿,
the choice e1 = 3 then implies that each worker would receive !￿
1 =4 0 :50 thousand
per annum, and if ￿ =0 :30, would produce 52.65 thousand output, both of which
are also more or less consistent with recent data. 14 On the basis of (4.1), the implied
likelihood of rehire a￿
1 is 0.812 - that is, 81.2 percent of those in the jobless pool are
(re)hired each period.
The terms of the ninth proposition then allow \critical e￿ort e￿ects," the values
of ￿e required to induce capitalists to switch to the second method, to be calculated
with ease, and Table 1 reports these for various second method failure f2 ￿ f1 =0 :10
and detection d2 ￿ d1 =0 :50 rates. Consider, for example, the case where f2 =0 :15
and d2 =0 :60. The size of the failure e￿ect ￿f =( 1￿ f1)=(1 ￿ f2) is therefore
13 The second method can of course be interpreted as one that requires some, or
perhaps more, workers to supervise others.
14 To the extent that the value of e1 is smaller than expected, the model is ei-
ther less robust than desirable or, consistent with Juster (1986) or Bewley (1999),
workers do not dislike e￿ort as much as once believed. It should be noted, however,
that the former does not mean that the broader framework should be abandoned:
the introduction of a second, or dual, sector, for example, makes the model more
￿exible.
261.059, while the size of detection e￿ect ￿d is almost identical, 1.057. Recall from
the ￿rst condition (4.6) that a unique second method equilibrium exists when the
e￿ort e￿ect ￿e exceeds the failure e￿ect ￿f =1 :059 and the product of the two,
￿e￿f =1 :059￿e, is less than or equal to the detection e￿ect ￿d =1 :057 or, in other
words, ￿e ￿ 0:998, a contradiction. The second condition (4.7), on the other hand,
claims that such an equilibrium will exist if ￿e >￿ f (that is, ￿e > 1:059) and
￿e￿f >￿ d (that is, ￿e > 0:998) and output per unit of labor power ￿￿ exceeds
some critical bound ￿ ￿. Given the assumed values of d2 and f2, the bound is equal
to (1:64e2￿4:92)=(0:85e2￿2:70), and this will be less than ￿￿ = 15 when e2 > 3:20
or ￿e > 1:07. All three inequalities will be satis￿ed, therefore, when ￿e > 1:07, the
value reported in Table 1. The third condition (4.8), which requires that ￿e < 1:059
and ￿e < 1:057 and ￿e > 1;07, involves another contradiction. In fact, all but one
of the \not all" entries in Table 1 are based on the second condition. 15
One is tempted to conclude, then, that second method equilibria are possible,
even probable, for modest increases in the e￿ort/pace of production, despite the in-
crease in the breakdown rate. It seems almost certain, for example, that each of the
possible historical examples mentioned earlier - clocks, computers and production
lines - would meet such a test.
The patterns in Table 1 are consistent with intuition, of course: other things
being equal, for example, the higher the failure rate f2 or the lower the detection
rate d2, the greater the increase in the e￿ort level and/or the pace of production
needed to sustain a second method equilibrium. Furthermore, the threshold e￿ort
e￿ect seems more sensitive to variations in f2 and than d2: when f2 =0 :20, for
15 The exception is the case ( f2 =0 :15;d2 =0 :80): the ￿rst condition will be
satis￿ed if ￿e lies between 1.059 and 1.074, the second is satis￿ed if it exceeds
1.074, while the terms of the third condition are met if it lies between 1.057 and
1.059. It follows, then, that a second method equilibrium exists if, to two decimal
places, the size of the e￿ort e￿ect is 1.06 or more.
27example, an increase in d2 from 50 to 80 percent, the critical value of ￿e falls from
1.17 (e2 =3 :50) to 3.42 (e2 =3 :42), but when d2 =0 :60, a rise in the failure rate
from 15 to 25 percent causes the critical value of ￿e to rise from 1.07 (e2 =3 :20) to
1.26 (e2 =3 :79). This hints, but perhaps no more than that, that capitalists will
have some incentive to hunt for methods that increase e￿ort or pace on the basis of
closer supervision - an increase in the number of forepersons, for example - rather
than those which do so through simple speed up.
Table 2 reports the jobless rates in second method equilibria and the change -
that is, the displacement e￿ect - relative to the ￿rst method outcome (4.28 percent)
for the critical e￿ort e￿ects. 16 In the particular case ( f2 =0 :15;d2 =0 :60) con-
sidered above, for example, it is not di￿cult to determine that if a second method
equilibrium exists, the value of u￿
2 will be 4.72 percent, which implies that the \rate
of technological unemployment" or RTE will be 0.44 percent. The data suggest that
the RTE will be quite sensitive to variations in both f2 and d2. At one extreme,
a substantial increase in the failure rate, from 10 to 25 percent and a su￿cient
(28 percent) rise in e￿ort levels, from 3.00 to 3.83, is associated with an increase
in the overall jobless rate from 4.28 to 8.36 percent, or 4.08 percent technological
displacement if the detection rate remains constant. At the other, if the failure rate
remains constant and the detection rate rises from 50 to 80 percent, the jobless rate
falls, to 3.02 percent, in which case the RTE is negative.
Some readers will be concerned that the data in Table 3, which reports the
annual real income of workers in a second method equilibrium, seem inconsistent
with the previous comparative statics exercises, where it was observed that higher
failure rates are associated with lower wages, other things being equal, or that the
detection rate exerts no direct in￿uence on compensation. There is no contradiction,
16 The use of critical e2 values does not matter much in this context - if a sec-
ond method equilibrium exists, the value of u￿
2 is not a function of e2, for reasons
discussed earlier - but it is relevant for the other data reported here.
28d2
0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
0.10 NA All(1.00) All(1.00) All(1.00)
0.15 3.23(1.07) 3.20(1.07) 3.18(1.06) 3.17(1.06)
f2 0.20 3.50(1.17) 3.47(1.15) 3.46(1.15) 3.42(1.14)
0.25 3.83(1.28) 3.79(1.26) 3.76(1.25) 3.74(1.25)
Table 1. Critical E￿ort Levels (and E￿ort E￿ects) For A Second Method Equilibrium
d2
0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
0.10 NA 3.71(-0.56) 3.32(-0.96) 3.02(-1.26)
0.15 5.35(+1.08) 4.72(+0.44) 4.27(-0.01) 3.93(-0.34)
f2 0.20 6.69(+2.41) 5.96(+1.69) 5.45(+1.17) 5.06(+0.79)
0.25 8.36(+4.08) 7.52(+3.25) 6.93(+2.66) 6.49(+2.21)
Table 2. Jobless Rates (and Changes) in Second Method Equilibrium
For Critical E￿ort Levels
29d2
0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
0.10 NA 40.5(0.00) 40.5(0.00) 40.5(0.00)
0.15 41.2(+0.68) 40.8(+0.30) 40.5(+0.05) 39.0(-1.48)
f2 0.20 42.0(+1.50) 41.6(+1.14) 41.5(+1.02) 41.0(+0.54)
0.25 43.1(+2.59) 42.6(+2.14) 42.3(+1.80) 42.1(+1.58)
Table 3. Real Wages ($th) (and Changes) in Second Method Equilibrium
For Critical E￿ort Levels
d2
0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
0.10 NA 83.9(+2.73) 85.9(+4.77) 87.5(+6.35)
0.15 79.1(-2.09) 82.1(+0.89) 84.3(+3.13) 86.0(+4.88)
f2 0.20 76.6(-4.53) 79.9(-1.27) 82.4(+1.19) 84.3(+3.12)
0.25 72.8(-7.41) 77.3(-3.84) 80.0(-1.12) 82.2(+1.02)
Table 4. Likelihood of Rehire (and Change) in Second Method Equilibrium
For Critical E￿ort Levels
30in fact, because other things are not equal here - the compensation of workers is
calculated for the smallest second method e￿ort levels consistent with equilibrium
(that is, for the critical e￿ort e￿ect) and, as Table 1 evinces, these are not constant
across (f2;d2) combinations. In particular, because an increase in the failure rate
is also associated with an increase in the threshold e￿ort e￿ect, the consequences
for compensation are uncertain a priori. This said, one could infer that more often
than not, real wages rise - in the extreme case, almost $3000 per annum - and
that there is often a trade-o￿ of sorts in second method equilibria, between better
compensation and increased labor market slack. If such a trade-o￿ exists, it has
important implications for social welfare, and these are considered in more detail
in the next section.
Last, the likelihoods of rehire in a second method equilibrium are listed in Table
4, and these data underscore the subtle relationship between the unemployment
rate and the rate of rehire or its continuous time analogue, the mean jobless spell.
Consider once more the case where f2 =0 :15 and d2 =0 :60: relative to the ￿rst
method equilibrium, the jobless rate rises, from 4.28 to 4.72 percent, but so does
the likelihood of rehire, from 81.2 to 82.1 percent. That is, the jobless rate and the
mean jobless spell move in opposite directions, a result that in the context of recent
labor market behavior - a substantial but gradual fall in the jobless rate and, for
some time, little or no movement in jobless spells - merits attention. At the least,
it prompts a simple, but often overlooked, question: Which is the better measure of
labor market slack? 17 The divergence of these two measures owes to the fact that,
in this particular case, the number of job seekers at the start of each period is also
larger: although the proportion of these who receive an o￿er is greater than it was
in the ￿rst method equilibrium, so, too, is the absolute number of workers who do
17 Matthews and Kandilov (2000) consider this question from the perspective of
the empirical Phillips curve, and ￿nd that in this context, the \cost of job loss,"
which is a function of a not u, is a more reliable measure.
31not. From another perspective, while the jobless pool is larger, so is the rate at
which it \turns over."
5.2 Social Welfare
The use of identical workers facilitates the construction of social welfare functions,
more so if one is further prepared to assume that workers alone are also the share-
holders in ￿rms. Even without this restriction, however, the sum of workers’ satis-
factions each period, Nv(!;e)+( H ￿ N)v(0;0), is an obvious candidate measure.
Because workers are further assumed to be risk averse, this particular measure
\collapses" to N(! ￿ e) or, scaled, (1 ￿ u)(! ￿ e), where u is the jobless rate.
It then follows that within the framework described here, second method equi-
libria will cause social welfare to rise if (1 ￿u￿
2)(!￿
2￿e2) is more than (1 ￿u￿
1)(!￿
1￿e1)







1)(￿￿(1 ￿ f1) ￿ 1)
(1 ￿ u￿




2 are functions of e1 and/or e2, this condition establishes a
lower bound for the e￿ort e￿ect. Some will wonder whether this result constitutes
a paradox of sorts: shouldn’t the likelihood that social welfare rises decrease as
second method e￿ort levels rise? The answer is no, not for this model, because once
a second method equilibrium is established, the resulting rise in real wages more
than o￿sets the increase in required e￿ort.
With this in mind, the values of the right hand side of (5.1) are reported in
Table 5 for the same combinations of f2 and d2 used in the previous section, under
the assumption that the e￿ort e￿ects are su￿cient to sustain a second method
equilibrium.
To several decimal places, the numbers are almost identical to those in Table
1 - that is, if the e￿ort e￿ect is \large enough" to induce capitalists to switch
from the ￿rst method, it will also be associated with an increase in social welfare.
Given the displacement and compensation data in Tables 2 and 3, this means that
from a collective standpoint, workers will often be better o￿ in a second method
32d2
0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
0.10 NA All All All
0.15 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.05
f2 0.20 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.15
0.25 1.27 1.26 1.25 1.25
Table 5. Threshold E￿ort E￿ects for Improvements in Social Welfare
d2
0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80
0.10 NA 50.7(0.30) 50.9(0.50) 51.7(0.66)
0.15 50.6(0.27) 50.5(0.13) 50.5(0.06) 50.5(0.08)
f2 0.20 50.9(0.55) 50.9(0.50) 51.0(0.64) 50.7(0.25)
0.25 51.3(0.93) 51.3(0.86) 51.2(0.78) 51.1(0.75)
Table 6. Output per Person (and Change) in Second Method Equilibria
For Critical E￿ort Levels, in Thousands
33equilibrium with higher wages but more labor market slack. Whether or not these
results explain, or even contribute to an explanation of, the infrequent nature of
\Luddite-like" resistance to technological change, even when it is the conditions of
production that are a￿ected, is a matter for future research.
In cases where redistribution is possible, income per capita, Q=H = ￿e(1 ￿
f)(N=H)=￿e(1 ￿ f)(1 ￿ u), is another reasonable measure of social welfare. 18
Given the same parameter values, income per capita is 50.4 thousand constant
dollars per annum in a ￿rst method equilibrium, and Table 6 lists the income per
capita and absolute increase/decrease in second method equilibria for the threshold
e￿ort e￿ect. In each cases, output per capita rises, even if the di￿erence is sometimes
small.
5.2 Policy Implications (?)
It is reasonable to wonder whether there is a rationale, let alone scope, for inter-
vention within the narrow con￿nes of this model - for reasonable parametrizations,
after all, second method equilibria are associated with an increase in the sum of
workers’ utilities. There are nevertheless at least two sorts of state initiatives that
merit attention here. First, even if social welfare increases, it should be recalled
that the same parametrization also suggests that workers are displaced in second
method equilibria. This is not the case, however, with \pure" technical change -
that is, an increase in the value of ￿ rather than the e￿ort level e or the likelihood
of detection d - which, within this framework, causes the real wage ! to rise and
labor market(s) to be less slack. (In graphical terms, \improvements" in the meth-
ods, as opposed to the conditions, of production cause the horizontal labor demand
schedule to shift upward, but leave the incentive constraint or NSC unchanged.) To
the extent that ￿rms or capitalists must invest resources to pursue new methods
18 This is not income per capita in the strict sense, however, because total output
Q is measured relative to the number of workers, not workers and capitalists.
34of either sort, and that their decisions are sensitive to ￿nancial and tax incentives,
there emerges a possible role for public policies. While the model is not detailed
enough to provide rigorous support for such a claim, it is at least consistent with a
public preference for \basic" over \organizational" research.
Second, the state can mitigate whatever displacement does occur if it can either
reduce the separation/quit rate q or somehow reduce the cost of e￿ort to individual
workers, inasmuch as both of these cause the NSC to shift downward and, within
the context of the model, induce ￿rms to hire more workers without a decrease
in compensation. What sorts of policies might achieve this? Whatever their other
consequences, those which reduce stress in the workplace - anxieties about health or
child care, discrimination and harassment, for example - would perhaps have such
an e￿ect.
6. Conclusion
Recent work on the \e￿ort extraction problem" has rekindled interest in the clas-
sical distinction between labor power and e￿ective labor: because the abilities of
capitalists or their designates to monitor e￿ort are limited, individual workers ex-
ercise some control over their contributions to production. The failure to connect
the resultant \workplace discipline" issues with capitalists’ choice of technique is
a weakness of the EWH literature, however, one that this paper attempts to re-
dress. Although the model described here exhibits few hard and fast properties,
it does suggest that methods of production will sometimes be chosen for unusual
reasons - that is, increased e￿ort or pace of production, or closer supervision. The
observation that such methods are also often associated with increased failure rates
moderates, but does not eliminate, their attractiveness. Furthermore, for reasonable
parameter values, the widespread adoption of such methods can produce substantial
technological dispacement.
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38Appendix 1. Proofs of Propostions.
Proof of Proposition 1 : There are four scenarios under which the method k non-
shirker could nevertheless lose her position at the end of a particular period. With
likelihood fkdksk, she will fail, be detected and then dismissed; with likelihood
fkdk(1￿sk)q, she will fail, be detected, not dismissed but quit for other reasons; with
likelihood fk(1 ￿ dk)q, she will fail, not be detected, but quit; and with likelihood
(1￿fk)q, she will not fail but quit. The likelihood that she will ￿nd herself without
work at the start of the next period, then, despite the fact that she is not a shirker,
is equal to the sum of these or, collecting terms, fkdksk + q(1 ￿ fkdksk), and the
likelihood that she retains her position is therefore 1 ￿ (fkdksk + q(1 ￿ fkdksk)) =
(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ fkdksk). Given the form of the objective function (2.1), Bellman’s
Principle implies that:
V1;k = !k ￿ ek + ￿((1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ fkdksk)V1;k +(fkdksk + q(1 ￿ fkdksk))V3)
which, after collection of terms, is the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 2 : There are three \roads to joblessness" for the method k
shirker. The likelihood that she will be detected and then dismissed in a particular
period is dksk; the likeihood that she will be detected, not dismissed but quit for
other reasons is dk(1 ￿ sk)q; and the likelihood that she will not be detected but
nevertheless quit is (1 ￿ dk)q. The likelihood that she will be without work at the
end of each period is therefore, after some simpli￿cation, dksk +q(1 ￿dksk), which
implies that with likelihood 1 ￿ (dksk + q(1 ￿ dksk)) = (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ dksk), she will
retain her position from one period to the next. Under the assumption that e =0
when she shirks, Bellman’s Principle implies that:
V2;k = !2 + ￿((dksk + q(1 ￿ dksk))V3 +( 1￿ q)(1 ￿ dksk)V2;k)
which, after collection of terms, is the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 4 : If the conditions (2.5) are satis￿ed, a jobless worker will
receive, and accept, an o￿er of method k work with likelihood ak, but will not be
o￿ered either ￿rst or second method work with likelihood 1 ￿ a1 ￿ a2. It follows
from the de￿nitions of V1;k and V3 that:
V3 = a1V1;1 + a2V1;2 +( 1￿ a1 ￿ a2)￿V3
which, after simpli￿cation, is (2.6).
Proof of Proposition 5 : Substituting for V1;1 and V1;2 in (2.6):
(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a1 ￿ a2))V3 = a1
￿
!1 ￿ e1 + ￿(f1d1s1 + q(1 ￿ f1d1s1))V3




!2 ￿ e2 + ￿(f2d2s2 + q(1 ￿ f2d2s2))V3
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2)
￿
39Multiplying both sides by (1 ￿￿(1￿q)(1￿f1d1s1))(1￿￿(1￿q)(1￿f2d2s2)) yields,
after some simpli￿cation,
 0 = a1(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1))(!1 ￿ e1)+a2(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2))(!2 ￿ e2)
where
 0 =( 1￿ ￿(1 ￿ a1 ￿ a2))(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1))(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2))
￿ a1￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2))(f1d1s1 + q(1 ￿ f1d1s1))
￿ a2￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1))(f2d2s2 + q(1 ￿ f2d2s2))
It is then tedious, but not di￿cult, to show that  0 can be rewritten as:
 0 =( 1￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a1)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1))(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a2)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2))
which can be substituted into the previous expression to obtain the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 6 : Rewrite (2.5) and (2.6) as:
!1 =  1e1 +( 1￿ ￿)V3 !2 =  2e2 +( 1￿ ￿)V3
(1 ￿ ￿)V3 = a1 3(!1 ￿ e1)+a2 4(!2 ￿ e2)
where
 1 =
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d1s1)
￿(1 ￿ q)d1s1(1 ￿ f1)
 2 =
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d2s2)




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a1)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1)
 4 =
1
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a2)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2)
Substitution for (1 ￿ ￿)V3 in the expressions for !1 and !2 and collection of terms
leads to, in matrix terms:
￿
1 ￿ a1 3 ￿a2 4







 1e1 ￿ a1 3e1 ￿ a2 4e2











1 ￿ a2 4 a2 4
a1 3 1 ￿ a1 3
￿￿
 1e1 ￿ a1 3e1 ￿ a2 4e2
 2e2 ￿ a1 3e1 ￿ a2 4e2
￿
where
￿=( 1￿ a1 3)(1 ￿ a2 4) ￿ a1a2 3 4 =1￿ a1 3 ￿ a2 4
40To obtain the NSCs, observe that:
!1 =
(1 ￿ a2 4)( 1e1 ￿ a1 3e1 ￿ a2 4e2)+a2 4( 2e2 ￿ a1 3e1 ￿ a2 4e2)
￿
=
(1 ￿ a2 4) 1e1 + a2 2 4e2 ￿ a1 3e1 ￿ a2 4e2
￿
=
(1 ￿ a1 3 ￿ a2 4) 1e1 + a1 3( 1 ￿ 1)e1 + a2 4( 2 ￿ 1)e2
￿
=  1e1 +
a1 3( 1 ￿ 1)e1 + a2 4( 2 ￿ 1)e2
￿
and, likewise:
!2 =  2e2 +
a1 3( 1 ￿ 1)e1 + a2 4( 2 ￿ 1)e2
￿
To establish the equivalence of these and (2.8), note that:
 3( 1 ￿ 1) =
￿
1
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a1)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1)
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f1d1s1)
￿(1 ￿ q)d1s1(1 ￿ f1)
￿
and
 4( 2 ￿ 1) =
￿
1
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a2)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2)
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2s2)
￿(1 ￿ q)d2s2(1 ￿ f2)
￿
Proof of Proposition 8 : Since the conditional likelihood of dismissal is one, a pro-
portion f1d1 of all ￿rst method workers will fail, be detected and then dismissed
each period, and an additional q(1 ￿ f1d1) percent will not fail but quit for other
reasons in equilibrium, so that ( f1d1 +q(1￿f1d1))N1 ￿rst method workers will lose
their positions at the end of each period. In ￿ow equilibrium, the same number
will be hired from the pool of job seekers at the start of the next period. Like-
wise, (f2d2 + q(1 ￿ f2d2))N2 second method workers will be hired and ￿red each
period. It also follows that N1 ￿(f1d1 +q(1 ￿f1d1))N1 =( 1￿q)(1 ￿f1d1)N1 ￿rst
method workers and (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ f2d2)N2 second method worrkers will retain their
positions from one period to the next, so that the total number of job seekers must
be H ￿(1￿q)((1￿f1d1)N1 +(1￿f2d2)N2): The likelihood of rehire ak is the ratio
of new method k hires to the total number of jobless workers, the stated result.
41